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Abstract  
I analyse the incidence of trust between employee representatives and management at the 
firm level in EU member states. Most previous analyses focus primarily on employees’ trust 
in the employer, but I consider both sides. The analysis confirms, but generalizes, some 
known stylized facts such as that trust is relatively high in Scandinavian countries but 
relatively low in Mediterranean countries. My analysis also reveals a number of novel 
stylized facts, including a high degree of variability in Central and Eastern Europe. 
Furthermore, strong mutual trust is very rare throughout Europe and the trust relationship is 
systematically asymmetric, as employers’ trust in the employee side is systematically higher 
than the reverse relationship. 
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Introduction 
 
An established academic literature considers that trust between employees and their representatives 
(the employee side) and management (the employer side) usually improves the efficacy of their 
interaction for several reasons. If each side has trust in the other, the quality and quantity of 
communication are intensified (Taylor, 1989), encouraging both sides to share relevant information 
(Butler, 1995). This in turn fosters problem-solving behaviour and willingness to compromise 
enabling bargaining outcomes in their long-term mutual interest (Purcell, 1974). Thus, not only trust 
in general but mutual trust in particular can be considered to be pivotal for the efficacy of the 
employment relationship and decisive for the ‘success’ or ‘failure’ of companies. Therefore it is 
important not only to know the level of trust in the employment relationship, but also to understand 
which factors affect and facilitate this relationship.  
Although there is a reasonable amount of theoretical and empirical research on the influences 
on trust in general, as well as in the employment relationship, and on variations in trust between 
companies and countries (Delhey and Newton, 2005), relatively few stylized and generalizable facts 
have emerged regarding trust at the company or establishment level. This lack of generalizability is 
because most analyses are based on single company or country cases (Bryson, 2001; Dietz, 2004; 
Guest et al., 2008). Furthermore, previous literature took a largely one-sided view of the trust 
relationship, concentrating mainly on employee trust in the employer (Holland et al., 2012; Morgan 
and Zeffane, 2003; Searle et al., 2011). There is comparatively very little research on trust in the other 
direction. Empirical information and research on the incidence of mutual trust in the employment 
relationship is even more exceptional: a significant research gap which this article addresses.  
In this article I provide an overview of how trust between the two sides varies in different 
firms in different European countries, and also a cross-sectional analysis of the factors which 
determine trust. I use a unique, large and comprehensively matched employee/employer data set 
which covers trust relationships at the company or establishment level. This not only gives an 
overview of how trust between the two sides varies in different firms in different European countries, 
but also provides a cross-sectional analysis of the factors which determine trust.  
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In the next section I review the role of trust in the employment relationship, then outline my 
conceptualization of trust and provide information on the empirical methodology used. Next I provide 
an overview of trust between the two sides in the employment relationship and explore differences 
and similarities between countries. On this basis I investigate the determinants of trust, beginning with 
an outline of the hypotheses and then their testing. I conclude by summarizing the main results and 
highlighting the identified stylized facts, before outlining the relevance of the analyses for further 
academic discussion. 
 
 
The employment relationship and trust 
 
As regards the role of trust in the employment relationship the work of Fox (1974) still forms the 
basis for current discussion. More specifically, Fox developed one of the first systematic analysis of 
trust in the employment relationship even though, as he noted, its importance had been recognized 
previously in the academic literature. Inspired by the theoretical work of Marx, Spencer and in 
particular Durkheim (Roche, 1991), he argued that much of the employment relationship is beyond 
the scope of a formal contract. In his theory of trust dynamics he argued that a central problem of 
industrial advance is the decline in discretion at the workplace level, which leads to a loss of trust and 
increasing conflict between employees and employers. He further proposed that this development can 
be impeded or even reversed by establishing a partnership or bargaining relationship between the two 
sides (Wood, 1977): what would now be termed social dialogue. 
This seminal contribution on the role of trust became an integral part of subsequent debates in 
the fields of sociology of work and labour and political economy (Kelly, 1999). His work also became 
an essential element in the HRM literature on workplace partnerships (Guest, 2016; Johnstone and 
Wilkinson, 2017; Saridakis et al., 2017). Nevertheless, apart from the psychological contract 
literature, the role of trust has never gained strong momentum within the subsequent employment 
relationship literature (Dietz, 2004; Roche, 1991).  
This neglect of the role of trust is particularly noticeable in the comparative industrial 
relations literature. Some studies have analysed different concepts of trust in the employment 
relationship, including institutional and system trust (Lange, 2014) whilst others have explored intra-
organisational trust. Within this literature, research has analysed the role of trust between employees, 
management and trade unions in the implementation and efficacy of various HRM policies and 
practices (Dietz, 2004; Guest et al., 2008; Holland et al., 2012); others have investigated the impact of 
organizational change on trust relationships (Laplante and Harrisson, 2008). Another research strand 
analyses the determinants of trust in the employment relationship by focusing on the factors that 
explain employee trust in the employer (Bryson, 2001; Holland et al. 2012; Morgan and Zeffane, 
2003; Searle et al., 2011). Yet far less attention has been paid to either the role of trust by employers 
in employees, or to mutual trust. 
This lack of research on mutual trust in the employment relationship, particularly in terms of 
empirical analysis, is undoubtedly a research gap because it is precisely the incidence of mutual trust 
that is important for the efficacy of social dialogue in general and collective bargaining in particular. 
The significance of mutual trust is supported by its centrality to negotiation and bargaining situations 
in general (Axelrod, 1984). Trust between two parties reinforces an efficient interaction as it reduces 
uncertainty and complexity (Luhmann, 1979), encourages risk-taking behaviour (Ross and LaCroix, 
1996) and reduces transaction costs (Fukuyama, 1996). Thus, it is reasonable to expect that mutual 
trust between employees and employers can also reinforce integrative and cooperative negotiations in 
social dialogue and collective bargaining (Walton and McKersie, 1965). If trust intensifies the quality 
and quantity of communication (Taylor, 1989), this encourages the sharing of necessary information 
and provides the basis for deals which could lead to long-term mutually beneficial outcomes (Butler, 
1995; Ilsøe et al., 2018; Nienhueser and Hossfeld, 2011; Purcell, 1974) even if this involves 
compromises and short-term losses for one side.  
Given the lack of research on the incidence and role of trust from and in both sides and in 
particular of mutual trust, I analyse the trust relationship of each party in the other and assess its levels 
and determinants across Europe.  
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Conceptualization and data 
 
I conceptualize trust in the employment relationship on the basis of Dietz (2004), as a willingness to 
render oneself vulnerable to another party on the expectation that the other party will not exploit that 
vulnerability. In order to assess the incidence of trust, I use data from the European Company Survey 
(ECS) 2013, which collected representative establishment-level data for establishments with 10 or 
more employees; I use the term ‘firms’ throughout which is more commonly used in the academic 
literature. The survey is based on interviews with managers and employee representatives in in 6,548 
firms in the 28 EU member states (at the time of writing) on employment relations and HRM issues. 
As regards the operationalization of trust, the ECS asked: ‘please tell me --- based on your 
experiences with the [employee representation or management, respectively] at this establishment --- 
whether you agree or disagree?’. As in many previous studies (Brown et al., 2015), the answer 
categories were: ‘strongly agree’, ‘agree’, ‘disagree’, ‘strongly disagree’, ‘don’t know’, ‘no answer’, 
allowing a graduated categorization of high- to low-trust relationships (Fulmer and Gelfand 2012). 
As the domain of analysis is the firm level, trust here refers to the intra-organizational 
relationship between representatives of employees’ representation in the firm and management. Trust 
here refers to the institution of employee representation and management and not to any other form of 
trust, such as for example institutional or system trust (Bachmann and Inkpen, 2011; Luhmann, 1979; 
Wicks et al., 1999). However, depending upon the institutional context of countries in which the firm 
is embedded, employee representation could be (formally or informally) linked to a (national, sectoral 
or company) trade union, could be formed and initiated (voluntarily) by the employer side or could be 
legally mandated (a works council). Thus, dependent upon the firm and country context, trust in and 
of the employee side captures a wide range of different forms of employee representation.  
I refer to strong trust if the answer was ‘strongly agree’ and to some trust if the answer was 
‘agree’ and use the term trust alone to cover both responses. I use the term mutual trust if trust is 
present on both sides. Given that I differentiate between ‘some’ and ‘strong’ trust, I also differentiate 
between some and strong mutual trust. Although there is discussion in the literature on the advantages 
and disadvantages of analysing distrust (Saunders et al., 2014), I concentrate on trust rather than on 
distrust, not only for reasons of space but also because distrust was rarely found in the sample. On the 
question of trust in employee representation, only 9 percent of managers answered that they ‘disagree’ 
or ‘strongly disagree’ and only 18 percent of employee representatives answered the question on trust 
in management that they ‘disagree’ or ‘strongly disagree’.  
 
 
Symmetries and asymmetries in the trust relationship and country variations 
 
As outlined above, a range of literature addresses why trust in management is high or low, but little is 
known about how much of this trust is reciprocated, meaning that the extent of mutual trust in the 
employment relationship is largely unknown. Below I examine the employment relationship and 
investigate trust of and in both sides. Table 1 provides an overview of the share of firms in which the 
employee representation has trust in the management and vice versa, relative to all firms in all EU 
member states.  
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
In the vast majority of firms, management has either some or strong trust in the employee 
representation. In 82 percent, the employee representation has either some or strong trust in 
management. However, from a methodological perspective, the category ‘some trust’ captures 
answers in the survey which were potentially affected by social desirability. Anonymity and 
confidentiality concerns which might cause a social desirability bias are certainly mitigated for in the 
data collection process but might not have been dispelled completely. Therefore it is reasonable to 
argue that ‘some’ trust in the other side should only be interpreted as an expression of a (very) weak 
form of trust, but that this is distinct from distrust and can be interpreted to reflect at least a ‘good’ or 
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‘normal’ (working) relationship which is characterized neither by serious conflict nor harmony. Trust 
in the other side is certainly different, and stronger, if the answer ‘strongly agree’ was given. As can 
be seen in Table 1, strong trust in the other side is much less frequent.  
It is also striking that management has more trust in the employee side than the other way 
round. This stylized fact holds for all indicators and forms of trust. Thus, trust between the two sides 
is not symmetric on an aggregate level. In order to investigate this asymmetry further, Figure 1 shows 
a comparison of trust by one side in the other for each country separately. This shows, with only one 
exception (Lithuania), that trust in employee representatives is consistently higher than trust in 
management. While for some countries the gap is relatively narrow (Cyprus, Luxembourg, Romania), 
in others it is comparatively large. The gap in the UK is particularly wide: management trust in 
employee representatives is in line with the EU average, but employee trust in management is 
exceptionally low (64 percent). 
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
The variations may reflect differences in the legal status of employee representation. In some 
countries, this has a statutory basis giving formalized rights, but in others is predominantly voluntary 
and representation rights depend upon management discretion. However, no such pattern emerges in 
Figure 1: there is no consistent clustering by statutory or voluntary basis. Regardless of the reasons for 
its extent, the empirical evidence clearly confirms the stylized fact that there is a consistent 
asymmetry in trust between the two sides. This asymmetry is evident both in countries such as 
Cyprus, Greece, Poland, and Spain where the share of firms in which either side trusts the other side is 
generally lower, but also in those states such as Bulgaria, Lithuania, Romania and Slovakia, in which 
trust in the other side is generally higher.  
Below, I investigate country differences in trust further by looking at mutual trust between the 
two sides. Figure 2 provides an overview of the incidence of mutual trust in all EU countries. The 
employment relationship is characterized by mutual trust in 77 percent of all EU member states, but 
there is a noticeable country variation: mutual trust is lowest in Poland (57 percent) and highest in 
Romania (95 percent). Again, there are no clear patterns in the ranking of countries. However, in 
countries where the employment relationship is often described as (relatively) harmonious, such as 
Sweden and Denmark in particular but also Germany (Delhey and Newton, 2005; Ilsøe, 2010), there 
is a higher incidence of mutual trust than where the relationship is usually seen as conflictual, for 
example Cyprus, Greece and Spain. By examining the ranking of countries on the basis of the 
incidence of strong mutual trust, the same weak pattern arises, with Scandinavian countries having 
(relatively) higher incidences of strong mutual trust and Mediterranean countries lower incidences.  
 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
The countries with the highest incidences of mutual and strong mutual trust are Estonia, 
Latvia, Romania and Slovakia. This is somewhat puzzling but also very revealing. The employment 
relationship in these countries, together with (almost) all other Central and Eastern European (CEE) 
countries, is contradictory. On the one hand, it is generally described as conflictual, but on the other 
hand, as ‘acquiescent’ (European Commission, 2009), which suggests that conflict is not expressed 
though immanently present. The results here clearly put this general characterization in perspective 
and point towards the presence of a far more complex picture of the trust relationship in CEE. The 
analysis shows that if (and only if) employee representation exists, trust between the two sides can be 
exceptionally high. However, the ECS only captures trust between the employee and employer side if 
employee representation formally exists. This means that we cannot rule out the possibility that if 
there is no employee representation, the relationship between employees and employers involves low 
or no trust and therefore is potentially in line with the previous general perception. Nevertheless, the 
results show that trust-building often overcame initial challenges in many CEE countries (Bernaciak 
2010; Frege, 2002) and even led to the formation of an employee representation based on high mutual 
trust. Furthermore, without being able to go into further details here with respect to country 
classifications, my results provide evidence that trust relationships are certainly very heterogeneous 
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across CEE and potentially also within countries. Finally, Figure 2 also shows that strong mutual trust 
is at a very low level across the EU, though there are national differences.  
 
 
The determinants of mutual trust 
 
Above I compared the incidence of trust in the employment relationship across countries and 
identified (a)symmetries between the two sides. I now address explanations, concentrating on mutual 
trust. Our data have a hierarchical structure since firms are clustered in different countries and sectors, 
so I base the analysis on a multilevel regression approach (Gelman and Hill, 2007). The modelling 
approach not only allows differentiation between the effects of different levels but also enables 
consideration of a number of potential determinants and can control for the effects of potential 
confounders.  
More precisely, my analysis investigates the reasons for differences in the incidence of 
mutual trust in different firms which are embedded in different country-specific institutional and 
socioeconomic contexts, following the methodology applied by Blunsdon and Reed (2003), Brown et 
al., (2015) and Bryson (2001). Furthermore, I investigate differences in the incidence of mutual 
(models 1) and strong mutual trust (models 2). Given that strong mutual trust is very rare, I expect 
differences in the relevance of factors which explain trust. In general, some factors or variables which 
can explain mutual trust between employees and employers might not be sufficient to explain strong 
mutual trust, as it may be more difficult to establish a strong trust relationship.  
As regards firm-level factors, I expect that size in terms of the number of employees affects 
the incidence of mutual trust, given findings that in smaller organizations, trust-building between all 
actors is easier (Lane and Bachmann, 1998). I also expect that firm performance matters and that 
mutual trust is facilitated by a well performing company and vice versa (Mishra and Mishra, 1994). 
As firm performance is multidimensional, I use a number of indicators including the financial 
situation, the development of labour productivity and the growth/or decline in the number of 
employees. Given that (potential) job loss is the most severe performance indicator for employees, 
this variable can be regarded as the most indicative for this category. As a further potential factor 
explaining mutual trust (Morgan and Zeffane, 2003), I consider the stability of the workplace, by 
looking at the role of a number of organizational/operational changes including those in 
organizational structure, products and services and production processes. In addition, I consider if a 
change in company ownership has an effect (Laplante and Harrisson, 2008), this is often an indicator 
of fundamental change and transition within a firm. Even though I do not expect all such changes to 
have a (similar) effect, I hypothesize that because of the uncertainty which is induced into the 
relationship (Wicks et al., 1999), any change has a negative effect on mutual trust. As another firm-
level factor, I control for a number of work and employee characteristics which are mentioned in the 
literature (Blunsdon and Reed, 2003; Brown et al., 2015) that potentially influence differences 
between firms in the incidence of mutual trust. These employee characteristics include the extent of 
teamwork, the number of hierarchical levels, and tenure practices as well as gender (proxied by the 
share of female employees) and age (proxied by the share of employees older than 50). Among these 
variables, the number of hierarchical levels is considered highly indicative, since hierarchies are often 
substitutes for trust (Mintzberg, 1979). Furthermore, the level at which collective bargaining takes 
place also potentially matters, because if collective bargaining takes place at a higher level (outside 
the firm), the role of a trustworthy employment relationship at firm level is different (Brandl and 
Ibsen, 2018) compared to where bargaining occurs at company level. I therefore include relevant 
controls in our models.  
As trust in general and therefore also between employees and employers differs across 
countries, not least because of country-specific traditions and socioeconomic and cultural differences 
(Clegg, 1976; Crouch, 1993; Delhey and Newton, 2005; Ferner and Hyman, 1998; Fox, 1974; 
Möllering et al., 2004; Uslaner, 2002), I apply a multilevel analysis with the country level first. In 
addition, in order to investigate the role of the country level further, I estimate a country fixed effects 
model. Furthermore, in order to capture the effects of any sector-specific differences in which firms 
are embedded, I analyse the effect of sector dummies, so as to capture any further differences in the 
socioeconomic environment. However, given that some sector characteristics partially coincide with 
 6 
firm characteristics (for instance, in some sectors the share of female employees is high) and that 
some variables reflect the same factor and therefore (potentially) cause multicollinearity problems in 
the estimation, I estimate the models in two versions. In versions (a), a parsimonious set of variables 
is estimated which includes only the most indicative variables for each determining factor; in versions 
(b), the wider set of variables outlined earlier including sector dummies is estimated. Please note that 
for reasons of space the sector estimates are not included in the following tables but are available in 
the online supplement. The results of the estimations are shown in Table 2 and the results presented 
are confirmed by further robustness checks which are available in the online supplement. 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
As can be seen, the size of the firm affects mutual trust as the magnitude of the significant 
coefficients increases with size. The effect is robust over all different models. Thus the higher the 
number of employees, the lower the incidence of mutual trust, which confirms the hypothesis that 
mutual trust is more likely in smaller firms.  
The hypothesis that firm performance affects the incidence of trust is confirmed over all 
models in terms of financial performance, but not in terms of labour productivity. As regards changes 
in the number of employees as an indicative performance indicator which is also used in the 
parsimonious models, there is a robust relationship for mutual trust but not for strong mutual trust. 
However, even though not all performance indicators are significant, the magnitude of the financial 
performance coefficient clearly shows that financial performance matters and different performance 
indicators have differing importance for the relationship between employees and employers and for 
mutual and strong mutual trust. Moreover, the results show that financial performance and mutual 
trust are positively associated and stimulate each other. 
As argued earlier, organizational and operational changes in the firm induce uncertainty in the 
employment relationship and such changes can be expected to be associated with lower incidences of 
mutual trust, even though different changes may have different effects. As can be seen in Table 2, this 
hypothesis is only confirmed in the case of a change in company ownership, as the likelihood of 
mutual trust, but not strong mutual trust, decreases significantly if ownership changes. However, 
changes in organizational structure, in the products and services provided, as well as any change in 
production processes do not significantly matter for the incidence of mutual and strong mutual trust.  
Table 2 also shows that only a few other factors which we control for affect the incidence of 
mutual trust. If collective bargaining takes place at the firm level, mutual trust (but not strong mutual 
trust) is significantly lower compared to no collective bargaining. However, this relationship is also 
not fully robust. As regards work and employee characteristics, the extent of teamwork and the 
number of hierarchical levels in the firm do not significantly influence mutual trust. Furthermore, the 
share of employees with open-ended contracts and who are older than 50 does not seem to affect the 
incidence of mutual trust. However, there is weak but not robust evidence that the share of female 
employees affects the incidence of strong mutual trust, but not mutual trust more generally.  
I argued that trust in the employment relationship is also influenced by idiosyncratic country 
differences and characteristics. These differences were also reflected and discussed in Figures 1 and 2. 
However, these country differences are unconditional and do not control for differences among firms 
in these countries. I therefore investigate conditional differences in the incidence of mutual trust by 
estimating the previous models (1b) and (2b) using country fixed effects. By introducing dummies for 
all countries, I can identify the conditional differences in the level of mutual trust between all 
countries in our sample. The results are shown in Table 3.  
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
The country dummy estimates show that mutual trust is generally very high and reflects 
similar country differences as shown in Figure 2; but the level of strong mutual trust is low, again 
with similar country differences as in Figure 2. The country estimates also confirm that in countries 
with ‘conflictual’ industrial relations traditions (such as Cyprus, France, Greece, Italy and Spain), 
mutual trust is lower than in other countries. Conversely, in countries with traditionally ‘harmonious’ 
employment relations (such as Denmark and Sweden), mutual trust is relatively high. Although these 
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results are generally in line with previous literature, in contrast to some expectations in the literature, 
in many CEE countries there is a high incidence of mutual trust between management and employee 
representatives, if the latter exist at firm level. This result points towards two reconsiderations of 
common views of the employment relationship in CEE. First, this is not a homogeneous ‘bloc’ or 
‘regime’: trust relationships in countries such as Poland and Slovenia are completely different from 
other CEE countries. Second, in contrast to previous characterizations (European Commission, 2009), 
the employment relationship in some of these countries is not generally conflictual but is marked by 
exceptionally strong mutual trust.  
Furthermore, the conditional and unconditional country differences in the level of mutual trust 
mimic each other almost completely in terms of relative differences between countries, as well as in 
the country-specific levels. This suggests that differences in trust in the employment relationship are 
mainly explained by long-term path-dependent country traditions and cultures rather than short-term 
and firm-specific characteristics.   
 
 
Conclusions: Some stylized facts 
 
Given that the academic literature considers mutual trust between employees and employers to be 
important for a well-functioning employment relationship and social dialogue, I investigated the trust 
relationship at the company level in all member states of the EU.  Using a matched employee and 
employer data set, I could generalize single-country and case study evidences but also identify a 
number of novel stylized facts which challenged some previous accounts and reasoning on trust in the 
employment relationship. As regards some facts for which case or country evidences existed before, I 
could show that the levels of trust between employers and employees, and of mutual trust, varies 
significantly across countries. I provide the first systematic and comprehensive comparison and 
picture of trust in all EU member states: in general, (mutual) trust is higher in Scandinavia and 
Northern Europe and lower in Mediterranean countries. As regards the determinants of mutual trust, I 
confirm previous studies: first, trust in the employment relationship is higher in small companies than 
in larger companies; second, mutual trust between employee and employer and firm performance are 
mutually reinforcing. 
As regards novel stylized facts, I show that the incidence of (mutual) trust in firms can largely 
be traced back to idiosyncratic country factors. Conversely, firm, employee and workplace 
characteristics as well as organizational and firm specific changes are largely irrelevant in explaining 
trust in the employment relationship; instead it is the larger socio-political context that matters..  
Furthermore, trust relations between employee and employers in CEE countries are 
heterogeneous: (mutual) trust is relatively high in some but low in others. This result not only sheds 
new light into the nature of ‘acquiescent’ employment relations in CEE countries but also challenges 
previous assumptions of low-trust employment relationships in CEE.  
Another key result is that I show that trust between the employees and employers is not 
symmetrical: trust by management in employee representatives is consistently higher than that of 
employee representatives in management. Even though the extent of the asymmetry varies across 
countries, its existence and direction clearly emerges as a robust stylized fact. Given that previous 
studies did not possess the empirical basis to identify this systematic asymmetry, there has been little 
(or no) attention to the nature, reasons and implications of this asymmetry; further research into this 
asymmetry is needed. For example, very little is known on why, in some countries, managers trust the 
employee representatives even though this trust is not reciprocated.   
Finally, my analysis showed that strong mutual trust is very rare, and in some countries is 
almost completely absent. Whilst there are notable differences across countries, the rarity of strong 
mutual trust emerges as another robust and important stylized fact. Strong mutual trust enables both 
sides to strike deals which might involve compromises and short term losses for one side but which 
eventually lead to long-term mutually beneficial outcomes, and the existence of strong mutual trust 
between the employee and employer side is potentially decisive not only for the efficacy of the 
employment relationship, but also for the ‘success’ and ‘failure’ of the company itself. In turn these 
results show that trust-building between employees and employers appears necessary for any political 
attempts to increase the efficacy and functioning of the employment relationship, as recently initiated 
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by international organizations (ILO and OECD, 2018). Hence this study provides a clear roadmap for 
current and future activities of international organizations, by both identifying in which countries and 
on which side in the employment relationship, trust-building activities are most needed (and are 
perhaps most challenging).  
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Table 1. Trust in employee/employer counterpart, EU averages of firms (%) 
    Strong trust Some trust Total trust 
Employer trust in employee representatives    25   67   91 
Employee representatives’ trust in employer    22   61   82 
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Figure 1. Country comparisons (%). 
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Figure 2. Mutual trust between employees and employers by country (%). 
 
 
Grey bars: some and strong mutual trust; black bars: strong mutual trust.  
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Table 2. Determinants of trust.  
 Two-level model Three-level model 
 Mutual trust Strong mutual trust 
 (1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) 
Constant 0.8543*** 
(0.0255) 
0.8037*** 
(0.0439) 
0.1196*** 
(0.0175) 
0.1149*** 
(0.0304) 
Establishment size (ref under 50)     
50-249 -0.0492*** 
(0.0129) 
-0.0401*** 
(0.0136) 
-0.0327*** 
(0.0077) 
-0.0324*** 
(0.0083) 
250+ -0.0621*** 
(0.0143) 
-0.0583*** 
(0.0158) 
-0.0390*** 
(0.0087) 
-0.0401*** 
(0.0097) 
Establishment performance      
Decrease in employment -0.0584*** 
(0.0113) 
-0.0321*** 
(0.0121) 
-0.0130* 
(0.0067) 
-0.0074 
(0.0073) 
Financial situation (ref bad or very bad)     
Very good  0.0948*** (0.0176)  
0.0394*** 
(0.0108) 
Good  0.0946*** (0.0123)  
0.0167** 
(0.0074) 
Increased labour productivity  0.0018 (0.0113)  
0.0000 
(0.0069) 
Organizational changes, past 3 years     
Ownership -0.0384** 
(0.0164) 
-0.0315* 
(0.0171) 
-0.0125 
(0.0098) 
-0.0163 
(0.0103) 
Structure  -0.0041 (0.0123)  
0.0035 
(0.0075) 
Products and services  0.0090 (0.0126)  
-0.0029 
(0.0076) 
Production processes  0.0005 (0.0129)  
0.0115 
(0.0078) 
Work and employee characteristics     
Hierarchy -0.0007 
(0.0030) 
-0.0051 
(0.0034) 
0.0012 
(0.0018) 
-0.0003 
(0.0021) 
Teamwork  0.0193 (0.0162)  
-0.0056 
(0.0098) 
Employees older than 50 (%)  0.0023 (0.0040)  
-0.0013 
(0.0024) 
Open-ended contract (%)  -0.0017 (0.0044)  
-0.0027 
(0.0027) 
Female (%)  -0.0005 (0.0045)  
0.0049* 
(0.0028) 
Level of collective bargaining (ref 
absence)     
Firm -0.0188* 
(0.0113) 
-0.0265** 
(0.0118) 
-0.0103 
(0.0067) 
-0.0116 
(0.0071) 
Sector 0.0050 
(0.0126) 
-0.0011 
(0.0130) 
-0.0027 
(0.0070) 
-0.0009 
(0.0073) 
National 0.0094 
(0.0132) 
0.0089 
(0.0136) 
0.0067 
(0.0075) 
0.0079 
(0.0078) 
R2 0.0102 0.0235 0.0058 0.0115 
N 6226 5735 6226 5735 
Panel corrected standard errors in parentheses. For reasons of space sector estimates are not presented 
here but available in the online appendix. 
*Statistically significant at the 10 %; ** 5%; *** 1% level.  
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Table 3. Determinants of trust (country effects). 
 Mutual trust 
Strong 
mutual trust    
 (1e) (2e)  (1e) continued (2e) continued 
Establishment size   Country  
50-249 -0.0409*** 
(0.0136) 
-0.0325*** 
(0.0082) 
AT 0.8243*** 
(0.0474) 
0.0188 
(0.0258) 
250+ -0.0604*** 
(0.0158) 
-0.0407*** 
(0.0097) 
BE 0.7453*** 
(0.0496) 
0.0604** 
(0.0275) 
Performance   BG 0.9313*** (0.0559) 
0.0463 
(0.0301) 
Decrease in employment -0.0312*** 
(0.0121) 
-0.0070 
(0.0073) 
HR 0.8124*** 
(0.0527) 
0.1319*** 
(0.0348) 
Financial situation: 
Very good 
0.0939*** 
(0.0176) 
0.0402*** 
(0.0108) 
CZ 0.9058*** 
(0.0479) 
0.1027*** 
(0.0315) 
Good 0.0937*** 
(0.0123) 
0.0169** 
(0.0074) 
CY 0.6788*** 
(0.0600) 
0.0134 
(0.0245) 
Increased labour productivity 0.0005 
(0.0113) 
-0.0004 
(0.0069) 
DK 0.8611*** 
(0.0428) 
0.0936*** 
(0.0272) 
Organizational change   EE 0.8789*** (0.0516) 
0.2692*** 
(0.0477) 
Ownership -0.0317* 
(0.0170) 
-0.0163 
(0.0103) 
FI 0.7703*** 
(0.0463) 
0.0686** 
(0.0271) 
Structure -0.0038 
(0.0123) 
0.0037 
(0.0075) 
FR 0.7215*** 
(0.0476) 
0.1051*** 
(0.0288) 
Products and services 0.0096 
(0.0126) 
-0.0027 
(0.0076) 
DE 0.7710*** 
(0.0485) 
0.1100*** 
(0.0302) 
Production processes 0.0011 
(0.0129) 
0.0116 
(0.0078) 
EL 0.7119*** 
(0.0603) 
0.0625** 
(0.0307) 
Work and employee 
characteristics   
HU 0.9044*** 
(0.0478) 
0.1144*** 
(0.0316) 
Hierarchy -0.0047 
(0.0034) 
-0.0003 
(0.0021) 
IT 0.7493*** 
(0.0486) 
0.0668** 
(0.0268) 
Teamwork 0.0193 
(0.0162) 
-0.0058 
(0.0097) 
IE 0.7595*** 
(0.0636) 
0.1145*** 
(0.0423) 
Employees older than 50  0.0023 
(0.0039) 
-0.0014 
(0.0024) 
LV 0.9855*** 
(0.0549) 
0.3990*** 
(0.0829) 
Open-ended contract -0.0022 
(0.0044) 
-0.0028 
(0.0027) 
LT 0.9610*** 
(0.0465) 
0.2304*** 
(0.0433) 
Female -0.0010 
(0.0044) 
0.0048* 
(0.0028) 
LU 0.7843*** 
(0.0517) 
0.0396 
(0.0268) 
Level of collective bargaining   MT 0.8242*** (0.0847) 
0.2432*** 
(0.0812) 
Firm -0.0256** 
(0.0119) 
-0.0114 
(0.0071) 
NL 0.8556*** 
(0.0428) 
0.0392* 
(0.0236) 
Sector 0.0029 
(0.0132) 
0.0013 
(0.0073) 
PL 0.6139*** 
(0.0470) 
0.0507** 
(0.0253) 
National 0.0099 
(0.0136) 
0.0084 
(0.0078) 
PT 0.7367*** 
(0.0637) 
0.0904** 
(0.0354) 
Sector   RO 0.9699*** (0.0444) 
0.2743*** 
(0.0401) 
Industry -0.0306* 
(0.0157) 
-0.0046 
(0.0095) 
SK 0.9391*** 
(0.0461) 
0.2208*** 
(0.0417) 
Construction -0.0162 -0.0072 SI 0.8417*** 0.0735*** 
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(0.0249) (0.0149) (0.0488) (0.0279) 
Commerce and hospitality -0.0042 
(0.0183) 
0.0112 
(0.0110) 
ES 0.6316*** 
(0.0464) 
0.0263 
(0.0236) 
Transport and 
communications 
-0.0706*** 
(0.0250) 
-0.0099 
(0.0152) 
SE 0.8256*** 
(0.0454) 
0.1352*** 
(0.0289) 
Financial services and real 
estate 
0.0199 
(0.0254) 
0.0052 
(0.0145) 
UK 0.6614*** 
(0.0624) 
0.1152*** 
(0.0368) 
R2    0.0799 0.0782 
N    5735 5735 
Notes and references as in Table 2. 
